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THE JURISDICTION OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL IN KOSOVO
Kerry R. Wortzel
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) was established by the United Nations Security
Council in 1993. International support for the Tribunal arose in
response to public outrage at the reports of atrocities committed
against men, women and children in the course of the conflict
between Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Croatians. 1 Until re-
cently, the Tribunal had focused almost exclusively on the
crimes committed in what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cro-
atia.2 This article will address the unique complications of en-
forcing the Tribunal's jurisdiction in Kosovo, which has been
acknowledged by the international community, at least until
very recently, as being within the sovereign territory of the new
Yugoslavia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which includes
the Republic of Serbia). The focus of this article is legal, rather
than political, although the enforcement of war crimes prosecu-
tions admittedly can be a very political process. Part II of this
paper addresses the factual history of the conflict in Kosovo.
Part III discusses the validity of the International Tribunal's
jurisdiction in Kosovo. Part IV analyzes the Tribunal's jurisdic-
tion with respect to individual crimes. Part V summarizes this
discussion. An analysis of the Tribunal's jurisdiction must be
divided between the period leading up to NATO's bombing cam-
paign in March, 1999, and the period following its commence-
ment, when the conflict arguably became an international
conflict. As this article will discuss, the classification of the con-
1 See Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNATL L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103, 104 (1997).
2 See id. at 105.
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flict as either internal or international ultimately determines
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to prosecute particular crimes.
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
A. The Pre-NATO Conflict in Kosovo
Kosovo itself is a province of Serbia, the dominant republic
of Yugoslavia. 3 As of late 1998, ninety percent of Kosovo's esti-
mated two million population was made up of ethnic Albanians,
most of whom are Muslims. 4 Serbia is a republic contained
within Yugoslavia, as were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Mace-
donia and Montenegro prior to the collapse of the former Yugo-
slavia in the late 1980's.5 Prior to Socialist Yugoslavia's
collapse (the former Yugoslavia known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia), the country was divided into six repub-
lics and two provinces, one of which was Kosovo.6 Under Josip
Broz Tito in the 1970's, the province of Kosovo achieved some
degree of political autonomy within socialist Yugoslavia and
Serbia. 7 Kosovo had its own representation - in the political
framework permitted in Yugoslavia at the time - in federal and
state bodies equal to that of the six Republics.8 The collapse of
the former Yugoslavia occurred following the death of Tito dur-
ing the 1980's. The exact date of its collapse is still subject to
debate. 9
Kosovo remained an autonomous province until 1989, when
Slodoban Milosevic rose to power as president of Serbia. It was
then that the Serbian parliament stripped Kosovo of its autono-
mous status.10 As part of an overall appeal to Serbian national-
3 See Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Charge to be Announced Against
Milosevic, WASH. POST, May 27, 1999, at Al.
4 See John M. Goshko, U.N. War Crimes Court to Probe Kosovo Deaths,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A32; Guy Dinmore, Some Serbs Quit Kosovo as
NATO Issues Warnings, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1998, at A29.
5 See Aleksa Djilas, Imagining Kosovo: A Biased New Account Fans Western
Confusion, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5, Sept. 1, 1998, at 124.
6 See Julie Mertus, Prospects for National Minorities under the Dayton Ac-
cords- Lessons from History: The Inter-War Minorities Schemes and the "Yugoslav
Nations," 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 793, n. 35 (1998).
7 See id.
8 See id. at n. 169. See generally Djilas, supra note 5.
9 See Mertus, supra note 6, n. 25.
10 See Justin Brown, Uncomfortable Peace in Kosovo Serb Leader says he'll
comply with international demands and avoid NATO strikes, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
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ist elements in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, Milosevic purged many
Albanians from their jobs and turned over control of the police
force to the Serbs.11 From that point on, all police officers in
Kosovo were Serbian. 12 Continued repression by Serbian au-
thorities led ethnic Albanians in the region to form under-
ground governments and schools, and eventually to the
formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the rural vil-
lages.' 3 The traditional hatred between Albanians and Serbs
stems in part from their cultural and religious identities: most
Albanians are traditionally Muslims, and most Serbs are tradi-
tionally Eastern Orthodox (as are many Russians).14
In the summer of 1997, Slobodan Milosevic was elected the
president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, rising from his
previous position as the president of the Republic of Serbia, the
dominant republic of Yugoslavia. 15 On February 28, 1998,
Milosevic launched an attack on the Kosovo Liberation Army
guerrilla separatist movement. 16 On the first day of the offen-
sive, ten men from the same family were singled out in the town
of Liksane. 17 They were beaten and eventually executed. Their
mutilated bodies were later returned to their families.18
As president of Serbia and then Yugoslavia, Milosevic is
generally considered an instigator of the collapse of the former
Yugoslavia and the resulting conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovena. 19
When the United States decided to implement an agreement
which eventually resulted in the Dayton accords, Richard Hol-
MONITOR, Oct. 14, 1998 at 1, 1998 WL 2371289; Mertus, supra note 6, at n. 25. See
generally Djilas, supra note 5.
11 See generally Brown, supra note 10.
12 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Accord Eases Crisis; Foreign Inspectors, Over-
flights to Gauge Yugoslav Compliance, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1998, at Al.
13 See generally Brown, supra note 10.
14 Id.; see also Russian Volunteers Said to Aid Serbs, RICHMoND TIMES Dis-
PATCH, June 24, 1999, at A6.
15 See Justin Brown, Yugoslav President Keeps Fading Political Options Open
As World Powers Meet June 8 for Likely Cease-Fire Call, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, at 6.
16 See id.
17 See Guy Dinmore, Serbians Leave Sites of Civilians Slayings; Initial Probe
Reveals Patterns of Atrocities, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1998, at A32.
18 See id. at 6.
19 See Jonathan S. Landay, Helping Kosovo's Refugees Before Winter is Only
One Goal, US. Officials Say Privately, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 15, 1998,
at 1. See generally Brown, supra note 15.
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brooke directly bypassed the Bosnian Serb leaders and negoti-
ated principally with Milosevic. 20 Milosevic himself dictated
the Serbs' position and forced Bosnian Serb leaders into agree-
ment.21 Milosevic is named by human rights groups as a war
criminal with command authority over documented war crimes,
and was indicted for crimes against humanity by the ICTY (In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) in
May 1999.22
In August 1998, other reports of atrocities by Serbian forces
against ethnic Albanians emerged from Kosovo. 23 These re-
ports included the burning and destruction of homes and towns,
and the killing of civilians. 24 Some reports indicated that in the
southwestern Kosovo town of Orahovac, Serb forces killed a
leader of the town's Halveti Shia Muslim sect and scores of his
followers in the basement of their religious building.25 Other
reports told of Serbian paramilitary forces removing twelve
truckloads of bodies from Orahovac on July 21, 1998 before
western observers and reporters got there.26
In September, 1998, an ethnic Albanian refugee who es-
caped to Germany reported that in May, Serbian policemen and
soldiers "smashed down the door" of their Ljuberic house where
he and his family were hiding.27 All of the men in the family, a
total of nine, were shot and killed on site. The refugee survived
a gunshot wound to the stomach with help from a neighbor, and
retold the story two months later when he made it to Ger-
many.28 According to reports by Amnesty International, the
refugee's family was not targeted for anti-government activi-
ties, but merely as "an act of revenge for the shootings of several
Serb policemen or civilians by members of the Kosovo Libera-
20 See Mertus, supra note 6, at n. 148. See, e.g., Warren Bass, The Triage of
Dayton, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 1, 1998, at 95, 1998 WL 14795989.
21 See Bass, supra note 20, at 95; Mertus, supra note 6, at n. 148.
22 See id.; Charles Trueheart, Charges Against Milosevic Detailed, WASH.
POST, May 28, 1999, at Al.
23 See Laura Rozen, What Does the U.S. Know About Atrocities in Kosovo,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 26, 1998, at 11, WL 2370206.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See R. Jeffery Smith, "We Will Kill You All": A Kosovo Survivor's Tale; Eth-
nic Albanian Tells of Massacre by Serbs, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1998, at Al.
28 See id.
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tion Army."29 Some of the wounds at the scene were confirmed
by a video of the site taken after the massacre and smuggled to
Albania. 30
As of the middle of October 1998, an estimated 700 to 750
ethnic Albanians had been killed. Some estimates put the
death toll as high as 1,532. 31 Another 250,000 to 400,000 eth-
nic Albanians had been forced from their homes. 32 Many of
those have found shelter in towns across Yugoslavia's border in
Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 33 However, as of Sep-
tember, 1998, 50,000 of those refugees were without shelter.34
Two hundred villages had been completely destroyed as of that
date.35
One of the most clearly documented cases of atrocities to
date occurred in late September 1998, in the town of Gornje
Obrinje, Yugoslavia. 6 There, nineteen ethnic Albanian civil-
ians were executed by Serbian police units following the killing
of seven policemen by KLA guerrillas.37 Other reports put the
number as high as twenty-eight.38 Most of those killed were
women, children and the elderly.39 All were killed either by
having their throats cut or by a bullet in the back of the head.40
The youngest killed was eighteen months old. Her throat had
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 See Justin Brown, Airstrikes in Kosovo May Just Fuel More Fighting in Ko-
sovo, Analysts Say, CHRISTLAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1998, at 5; see also Smith,
supra note 27, at Al.
32 See id.; see Thomas W. Lippman, U.S., NATO Preparing to Strike Yugosla-
via; Serb Atrocities Raise Urgency on Kosovo, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1998, at Al; Guy
Dinmore, Some Serbs Quit Kosovo as NATO Issues Warnings, WASH. POST, Oct. 2,
1998, at A29. See generally Landay, supra note 19.
33 See generally Dinmore, supra note 32.
34 See Guy Dinmore, New Kosovo Massacre May Spur NATO to Act, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 1998, at Al.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See Jonathan S. Landay, After Kosovo Killings, What? Evidence of New
Atrocities Tempts NATO to Strike Hard. But Hints of a Serb Withdrawal, However
Brutal, Forces Delay, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 1, 1998, at 1.
39 See id.
40 See id.
1999]
5
PACE INT'L L. REV.
been slit.41 One twenty-eight-year-old woman who was eight
months pregnant had her belly cut open.42 Diplomats and jour-
nalists had the opportunity to observe the results of the
massacre.
43
Within days of the massacre in Gornje Obrinje, fourteen
men were executed by Serbian police in a nearby farm com-
pound.44 Many farms in the region were torched and cattle
killed as police withdrew from the region before the declaration
of a uniliateral cease-fire by the Serbian government. 45 Other
allegations of rape and torture continued to surface. 46 These in-
cluded allegations by diplomats in the region that there were
special units of Serbian police created to carry out atrocities in
order to terrorize civilians into breaking their links with KLA
rebels. 47 These allegations have also been made by the United
Nations Security Council itself.48 Representatives for the inter-
national criminal tribunal in the Hague were already interview-
ing survivors of the massacres in late 1998. 49
On October 1, 1998, Zivadin Joyanovic, the foreign minister
of Yugoslavia, did not deny that atrocities had occurred, but
told Washington Post editors and reporters that "there is no in-
discriminate killing of civilians. There is only a struggle
against terrorism. Sometimes this leads to the abuse of civil-
ians."50  Yugoslavian government spokesman Radovan
Urosevac also denied that Serbian forces have committed atroc-
ities, but confirmed that Serbian troops completely ignored an
"Interior Ministry order" not to torch the homes of ethnic
Albanians. 51
41 See id.; see also Peter Finn, Massacre Haunts Child Survivors; Kosovo Refu-
gees Await Aid as NATO Grants Serbs 10-Day Reprieve, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1998,
at Al.
42 See generally Finn, supra note 41.
43 See id.
44 See generally Dinmore, supra note 17.
45 See id.
46 See id.; Finn, supra note 41.
47 See generally Dinmore, supra note 17.
48 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Yugoslavia Trims Kosovo Presence; Tanks Ordered
Out; Troops Start Leave, WASH. POST, OCT. 4, 1998, at A29.
49 See generally Dinmore, supra note 17.
50 See generally Lippman, supra note 32.
51 See generally Smith, supra note 12.
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B. Events Following the Commencement of NATO's Bombing
Campaign
On March 24, 1999, following a series of failed agreements
with the Yugoslav government, NATO began a seventy-six-day
bombing campaign designed to end the campaign of ethnic vio-
lence in Kosovo. Instead of ending the atrocities, the violence
intensified. The Serb's response took many in NATO by sur-
prise.52 Serbian military, paramilitary and security forces, as
well as Serb civilians, reacted directly against ethnic Albanian
civilians in an attempt to either kill them off or drive them out
of Kosovo.5 3 Albanians were indiscriminately executed, and
their homes were burned and destroyed.54 As of May 27, 1999,
approximately 800,000 ethnic Albanians had been forcefully
driven from their homes by Serb forces in an attempt to deport
most of the Albanian population of Kosovo from the province's
borders.55 Thousands more were executed.56 Reports indicated
a pattern whereby Serbs would pin residents indoors by shell-
ing or sniper fire, and then go door to door to kill or remove
Albanian residents from their homes. 57 Men would be sepa-
rated from their families, entire villages would be burned, and
survivors would be forced to move on.58 The ICTY's May 27,
1999 indictment against Slobodan Milosevic identified seven
sites of large-scale executions and at least 340 victims.59
In June, 1999, after Serb forces agreed to withdraw from
Kosovo, NATO forces discovered evidence of the atrocities as
they took control of the province. On June 14, 1999, NATO
troops discovered an apparent mass grave site containing as
many as one hundred bodies in the town of Kacanik.60 Ethnic
Albanian survivors described a scene in early April, 1999, when
Serbian troops went from house to house killing Albanians in
52 See Thomas W. Lippman & Dana Priest, NATO Agrees to Target Belgrade,
WASH. POST, March 31, 1999, at Al.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See supra note 3; see Trueheart, supra note 22.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.; Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Court Set to Start Kosovo Probe,
WASH. POST, June 10, 1999, at A22.
60 See R. Jeffrey Smith, In a Village, Signs of a Massacre, WASH. POST, June
15, 1999, at Al.
1999]
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response to the killing of seventeen Serbian soldiers in a
firefight the previous day.61 In the town of Vlastica, reporters
recorded the story of thirteen-year-old Vjore Shabani, who de-
scribed the day when her family and two others were lined up in
a house and shot in the head one at a time. Thirteen people
were killed, including her mother, father, and two-year-old
brother. 62 Vjore was wounded, but survived.63 In the town of
Cikatova, eighty ethnic Albanian men were reportedly executed
by Serbian troops on May 1, 1999, buried in a mass grave, then
later removed by Serbian troops and placed in individual
graves. 64 NATO and Tribunal personnel continue to discover
and collect physical and testimonial evidence of the violence
that took place.65
As noted earlier, the Tribunal indicted Slobodan Milosevic
and four other high-level officials for planning, instigating, and
aiding and abetting "a campaign of terror and violence directed
at Kosovo Albanian citizens."66 Milosevic, along with the
others, was placed in the chain of command responsible for the
campaign by U.S. and other classified data.67 Milosevic and the
others were indicted for crimes against humanity and violations
of the laws or customs of war, but not for genocide. 68 One for-
mer CIA analyst noted that western intelligence information in-
dicated that the entire campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was
planned at least six months before it took place, with Milosevic
at the top of the chain of command. 69
III. VALIDITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE ICTY AND ITS REACH
INTO Kosovo
In 1993, The United Nations Security Council passed a for-
mal resolution to establish an international tribunal to prose-
61 See id.
62 See Peter Finn, David Dinkel, R. Jeffrey Smith & Michael Dobbs, A Land-
scape of Ruin, Across Kosovo, Death at Every Turn, Brutal Campaign Litters Coun-
tryside with Bodies, Bones, WASH. POST, June 16, 1999, at Al.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See Trueheart, supra note 22.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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cute persons for violations of "war crimes" in the former
Yugoslavia. 70 As a result of the resolution, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was estab-
lished. The ICTY is considered a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations.71 The legal basis for the Security Council's power to
establish the Tribunal is set out in Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations. 72 Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter em-
powers the Security Council to take actions to maintain and re-
store international peace and security. 73 Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter opens Chapter VII, and states that
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore
international peace and security.74
Article 41 lists a range of possible enforcement measures:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interrup-
tion of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations. 75
While other articles empower the Security Council to use
force, 76 Article 39 is the legal basis for the creation of the inter-
national criminal tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
70 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), at para. 18
[hereinafter Secretary-General's Rep.].
71 See Cisse, supra note 1, at 106; see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
1-T, para. 37-38 (Oct. 2, 1995)(Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia) (visited Oct. 15, 1999) reprinted in <http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/appealldecision-e/acel-l.htm> [hereinafter Tadic].
72 See Secretary-General's Rep., supra note 70, at para. 24; see also Tadic,
supra note 73, at para. 28. Monroe Leigh, Report on the International Tribunal to
Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia, 1993 A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L. L. & P. 10 [hereinafter ABA Rep.].
73 See U.N. CHARTER ART. 7. See ABA Rep., supra note 72, at 10.
74 U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
75 U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
76 See Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo: Internal Conflict, International Law, 144 CHI.
DAILY L. BULL. 5, July 24, 1998; see, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 43.
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Rwanda. 77 The examples of enforcement measures in Article 41
are merely "illustrative," and do not exclude other enforcement
measures. 78 The only restriction under Article 41 is that the
measures do not involve the "the use of force." An ad hoc inter-
national criminal tribunal has been determined to be an appro-
priate enforcement measure which does not involve the "use of
force." 79 The actual capture of fugitives may indeed involve the
use of force, but this in itself may be justified under Article 43 of
the U.N. Charter.
In the context of Kosovo, considered to be within the sover-
eign territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the new
Yugoslavia), the question arises as to what constitutes a "threat
to international peace and security." The massive refugee flows
from Kosovo into the neighboring countries of Albania and Mac-
edonia arguably pose such a threat, and did so long before
NATO's bombing campaign.80 Long before the NATO cam-
paign, there was real concern on the part of the United States
and others in the international community that the mass of Al-
banian refugees would destabilize the relatively new and fragile
democracy in Macedonia.8 1 The massive refugee movements in
Rwanda in 1994 supplied one of the principal justifications for
the Security Council's decision to act during the Rwandan mas-
sacres.8 2 In addition, even clearly internal armed conflicts and
civil wars can constitute "threats to international peace and se-
curity" according to the settled practice of the United Nations. 3
The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic cited the United
77 See ABA Rep., supra note 72, at 10; see also Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case
No. ICTR-96-15-T, June 18, 1997 (reported in Virginia Morris, Prosecutor v. Kany-
abashi, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (1998)).
78 See ABA Rep., supra note 72, at 10; Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 35.
79 See id.
80 See Perritt, supra note 76, at 2; see generally Dinmore, supra note 32.
81 See Jonathan S. Landay, Helping Kosovo's Refugees Before Winter is Only
One Goal, US Officials Say Privately, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 15, 1998,
at 1.
82 See Virginia Morris, International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda .. , 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 66, 67-68, n.6 (1998)(quoting from Prosecutor v. Kanyabahsi, Case
No. ICTR-96-15-T, June 18, 1997).
83 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para. 37-38 (Oct. 2, 1995)
(Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia)
(visited Oct. 15, 1999) reprinted in <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/
ace-l.htm>.
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Nations' treatment of the recent crises in Liberia and Somalia
as examples of such threats.8 4
Finally, the Statute for the ICTY ("the Statute") is itself
very clear and unqualified as to the Tribunal's geographic and
temporal jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Statute states: "The In-
ternational Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Stat-
ute."8 5 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Serbia and Ko-
sovo contained within it, fall within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia (as do Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), and thus
well within the Tribunal's geographic jurisdiction.8 6 A new tri-
bunal specifically created for the province of Kosovo is not nec-
essary. This is important because the creation of a new tribunal
is subject to a veto by the permanent members of the U.N. Se-
curity Council. If the creation of a new tribunal were legally
required, it is likely that its creation would be subject to vetoes
by Russia and (probably) The Peoples Republic of China.
IV. THE ISSUE OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND THE
PRIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
The Statute of the ICTY provides that while the Tribunal
and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction over "serious
violations of international humanitarian law," the international
tribunal "shall" have primacy over national courts.8 7 In the Re-
port of the Secretary General of the United Nations pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 808, the Secretary General noted
that while national courts are encouraged to exercise jurisdic-
tion with respect to such crimes, the ICTY may at any time re-
quest the national courts to defer to its competence.88
s4 See id. at para. 30.
85 Statute on the International Tribunal for Kosovo, Annex to Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993)[hereinafter ICTY Statute); see also
Goshko, supra note 4, at 32.
86 See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 117-18
(1995)[hereinafter MORRIS & SCHARF].
87 ICTY Statute, supra note 85, art. 9(1),(2).
88 See Secretary-General's Rep., supra note 70, at para. 64, 65.
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Exercising criminal jurisdiction is considered an "essential ele-
ment" of state sovereignty, and the U.N. Security Council's
power to assert its primacy is limited to situations where the
Security Council has in some way exercised its power under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 9 As the trial chamber noted
in Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi (a case under the Rwandan tribu-
nal), Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter empowers a tribunal to
exercise primacy without the consent of the State in question.90
In making its holding, the Chamber applied principles spelled
out by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72. 9 1 The Appeals Chamber
serves as the appellate body for both the tribunals in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.92
In Tadic, one of the Appeals Chamber's justifications for ex-
ercising primacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that the relevant
territory, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had ap-
proved the jurisdiction of the ICTY.93 This was also the case in
Rwanda, which originally requested the creation of the ICTR,
although it did vote against the actual resolution creating itY 4
This was not the case, however, with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (the new Yugoslavia containing Serbia and Kosovo).
While consent is one justification given for the exercise of
primacy, another important justification for the exercise of the
Tribunal's primacy over the sovereignty of a nation-state is the
principle of Universal Jurisdiction.9 5 The underlying principle
of universal jurisdiction is that some crimes are so egregious as
to give all states jurisdiction over the accused to ensure that
89 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 126; U.N. CHARTER at 51, para.1.
90 See Kanyabashi, supra note 77, at 69; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 86, at 126-27 ("States are not precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the
crimes covered by the Statute by virtue of the establishment of the International
Tribunal. However, the International Tribunal may preempt a national court by
asserting primacy of jurisdiction in a particular case under Article 9(2) of the Stat-
ute... [I]t is for the International Tribunal to decide whether to assert its primacy
ofjurisdiction and thereby supercede the criminal jurisdiction of a national court in
a particular case."). Id.
91 See generally Tadic, supra note 71.
92 See Cisse, supra note 1, at 111.
93 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 56.
94 See Cisse, supra note 1, at 107.
95 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 57.
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those who commit such crimes answer for them.9 6 This prose-
cution is theoretically permitted to take place regardless of
whether there is any connection between the prosecuting state
and the offender.9 7 The rationale is that "there exist certain of-
fenses, which to their very nature, affect the interests of all
states, even when committed in another state or against an-
other state, victim or interest.... Thus, the principle of univer-
sal jurisdiction assumes that each state has an interest in
exercising jurisdiction to combat offenses which all nations have
condemned."98 The same principle was noted by the United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Demjanjuk v. Petrov-
sky:99 "This 'universality principle' is based on the assumption
that some crimes are so universally condemned that the perpe-
trators are enemies of all people. Therefore, any nation which
has custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to
law applicable to such offenses." 100
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic clearly utilized this princi-
ple in support of the tribunal's primacy in the former
Yugoslavia:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need
for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to
be raised successfully against human rights. Borders should not
be considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a
protection for those who trample underfoot the most elementary
rights of humanity .... Indeed, when an international tribunal
such as the present one is created, it must be endowed with pri-
macy over national courts. Otherwise, human nature being what
it is, there would be a perennial danger of international crimes
being characterized as "ordinary crimes". . . or proceedings being
96 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 512-513 (1992) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI].
97 See id.; see also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 122 n. 370.
98 BASSIOUNI, supra note 96, at 512-13.
99 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6' Cir. 1985)(holding that
the universality principle justified the State of Israel's prosecution of Demjanjuk
for alleged atrocities during World War II, as well the United States' extradition of
the defendant to Israel), vacated on other grounds, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10
F.3d 338 (6t' Cir. 1993).
100 Id.
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"designed to shield the accused," or cases not being diligently
prosecuted .... 101
The universal jurisdiction principle exists in part to permit
prosecution of those defendants who would not normally be pur-
sued criminally in their own territories, 10 2 even though a state
which does not prosecute such an offense can be held interna-
tionally responsible. 10 3 The universality theory has long been
used as a justification for prosecuting the crime of piracy on the
high seas where the crimes were not committed in a country's
territorial waters. 10 4
The principle of universal jurisdiction is not universally ac-
cepted, but it is recognized by such countries as
Israel, 0 5Australia and Canada. 10 6 This principle has also been
recognized in the United States. 07 However, as will be dis-
cussed in a later section, the universality principle, even when
101 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 58. But see Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of
Darkness: The Case Against the Faray of the Council Tribunal into the Rwanda
Crisis, 32 TEx. INT'L L. J. 329, 350. Sapru argues that Common Article 3 (of the
Geneva Conventions) and Protocol II were designed specifically to address internal
"strife," and that no universal jurisdiction arises automatically - state acquiescence
is required. See id. at 350. He notes that the preliminary drafts of Article 3 and
Protocol II contained provisions with language requiring mandatory compliance,
but that these provisions were subsequently removed because of fears of foreign
intervention in internal wars. See id.
102 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 58; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 88, at
122.
103 See RODIGER WOLFRUM, THE DECENTRALIZED PROSECUTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL OFFENCES THROUGH NATIONAL COURTS, IN WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 233, 235-36 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996) [hereinafter
WOLFRUM].
104 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 122, n. 370; BASSIOUN, supra note
96, at 518.
105 See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichinann, 36 INTERNATIONAL LAw RE-
PORTS 277, 290-93 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
106 See BAssiouNI, supra note 96, at 511.
107 See Demijanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated
on other grounds, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6 th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 221-24 (N.D. Ca. 1981). The biggest concern
on the part of the United States with the primacy issue is the potential for U.S.
citizens and soldiers to be brought within the jurisdiction of an international crimi-
nal court or war crimes tribunal. See also James Podgers, War Crimes Court
Under Fire, 84 A.B.A. J. 64, 66-68 (1998). Some supporters of an international
criminal court say that the U.S.'s concerns with primacy are unwarranted, espe-
cially in light of the U.S.'s veto power on the Security Council. See id. However, in
January 2000, the chief prosecutor of the ICTY announced that she was reviewing
the possibility that war crimes were committed by NATO forces during the Kosovo
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accepted, clearly does not apply to all crimes described as "war
crimes."
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it appears unlikely
that those responsible for various atrocities will be prosecuted
by the government. Even if some individuals are prosecuted,
the integrity of the proceedings in light of the political environ-
ment in Serbia and Yugoslavia comes into question. Not only
has Milosevic thus far refused to support the Tribunal's juris-
diction, but any decision otherwise on his part puts his own
political position within his country in jeopardy.108 Further-
more, Milosevic himself has been implicated in crimes in Ko-
sovo and the other territories in the former Yugoslavia.109
Primacy of the Tribunal in Kosovo would appear to be a neces-
sary prerequisite to seeing any alleged war criminals brought to
justice. 110
The holding of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic indicates
that the primacy of the Tribunal in Yugoslavia and Kosovo will
not be a concern from a legal standpoint. Whether the Tribunal
will be able to carry out its mandate, in Kosovo or in the other
territories of the former Yugoslavia, remains to be seen.
campaign. See Charles Trueheart, Professors Pursue War-Crimes Case Against
Nato, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2000, at A15.
108 See Justin Brown, 'Unsolved' Kosovo Plays to Survival of Milosevic Yugo-
slav President Keeps Fading Political Options Open as World Powers Meet June 8
for Likely Cease-Fire Call, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 8, 1998, at 6. See
generally Goshko, supra note 4.
109 See Mertus, supra note 6, at n.148; Trueheart, supra note 22.
110 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 133; ICTY Statute, supra note 85,
at art. 10. (It should be noted that the principle of non bis in idem does restrict the
Tribunal's exercise of primacy over national courts. Non bis in idem is the funda-
mental principle of criminal law that provides that a person may not be tried and/
or punished twice for the same crime. This principle is clearly reflected in Article
10 of the ICTY Statute. However, Article 10 sets out two exceptions which would
nevertheless permit an assertion of primacy. First, if a person was tried for an act
constituting a ordinary crime, that person may be tried again for the same act
constituting a different crime under the Statute. An example is an act which con-
stitutes the crime of murder or rape under national law, and also constitutes the
crime of genocide under international law. Second, if the national court proceed-
ings "were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from
international criminal responsibility," or were not "diligently prosecuted," the ac-
cused may be tried again by the Tribunal). See id.
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V. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE
CRIMES ALLEGED
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal in the
former Yugoslavia divides punishable crimes into four general
categories: Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Article 2), Violation of the laws or customs of war (Article 3),
Genocide (Article 4), and Crimes against humanity (Article
5).111 A critical element in the Tribunal's ability to punish vio-
lations of some of these crimes is whether the conflict can be
characterized as internal or international. 112 This is particu-
larly critical in the case of Kosovo, which, at least until very
recently, was viewed by the international community as within
the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Kosovo is not Bosnia in one crucial respect: Bosnia was an in-
dependent nation and had been recognized as such by major Eu-
ropean powers and the United States. Kosovo is not. It is part of
Serbia, and thus as a formal matter, the disputes between the
Serbian government and the Kosovo rebels are internal matters,
within sovereign prerogatives of the Serbian government. One of
the clearest principles of international law, now enshrined in Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the United Nations charter, is that other countries
must not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. 113
When some of the crimes alleged in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina occurred, both territories had not only declared
their independence, but also received international recognition
of their status. 114 That had not occurred with respect to Kosovo
prior to the NATO campaign, nor is Kosovo's status as fully in-
dependent formally recognized by the international community
at this time. 115 In addition, there is little, if any allegation that
the conflict involved parties outside of the territory of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia itself prior to the NATO bombard-
ment. While refugees have streamed across its borders,
potentially creating a "threat to international peace and secur-
111 See ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 2-5.
112 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 57.
113 Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo: Internal Conflict, International Law, 144
CHI.DAILY L.BULL. 5, July 24, 1998.
114 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 58.
115 See generally Perritt, supra note 76.
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ity,"116 this must be distinguished from a situation in which
parties outside the sovereign boundaries of Yugoslavia are
themselves participating in the armed conflict to a significant
extent.117 While a threat to international peace and security
establishes the right of the Security Council to act to restore
peace, it does not automatically establish the Tribunal's juris-
diction to punish all of the crimes alleged. This section ad-
dresses which of the crimes may or may not be enforced by the
tribunal based on the international or internal nature of the
conflict. The crimes that allegedly took place must necessarily
be divided between those that occurred prior to NATO's mili-
tary action, when the conflict could still be characterized as in-
ternal, and those that took place once the bombardment had
begun, when the conflict arguably became international in
nature.
A. Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute sets out the Grave Breaches
crimes punishable by the Tribunal. As the title indicates, they
are taken from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Grave
breaches include:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fled by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
of a hostile power;
116 See id.
117 See ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art.5. Much of the ICTY Statute re-
quires some form or armed conflict, at least as far as the crime of Crimes Against
Humanity is concerned. "Armed conflict" is defined very broadly: "[A]n armed con-
flict exists whenever there is a resort to armed forces between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State." See also Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 70.
This definition would apply at least from the time of the commencement of
Milosevic's offensive against the Kosovo Liberation Army in late February, 1998.
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(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.118
"Grave breaches" is obviously a broad area, and covers
many of the crimes alleged against the Federal Yugoslav Army
and police force in Kosovo. The critical issue is that the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions are directed to-
ward international wars. 119 The Appeals Chamber in Tadic
outlined the rationale behind the internal/international
distinction:
The international armed conflict requirement was a necessary
limitation on the grave breaches system in light of the intrusion
on State sovereignty that such mandatory universal jurisdiction
represents. State parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not
want to give other States jurisdiction over serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in their internal
armed conflicts - at least not the mandatory universal jurisdiction
involved in the grave breaches system. 120
While the United States has argued that Article 2 also applies
to armed conflicts that are internal in character, the Appeals
Chamber in Tadic held that the argument was unsupported by
any authority.12' The grave breaches provisions appear to be
so encompassing that it would seem very difficult to prosecute
war criminals if the crimes in question were committed within
Kosovo prior to the NATO campaign. If the rules under Article
2 are not applicable, prosecutions under the crimes of Genocide
and Crimes Against Humanity may be the sole source of crimi-
nal prosecution for the alleged atrocities. 22 It is not clear
whether these crimes will fill the gaps left by the inapplicability
of Article 2.
118 ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 2.
119 See THEODOR MERON, The Normative Impact on International Law of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in War Crimes in International
Law 211, 214; see also Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 84.
120 See id. at para. 80.
121 See id. at para. 83.
122 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 57.
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The events of recent months - late March to the present -
arguably created a different legal environment. NATO's mili-
tary action in Serbia and Kosovo has expanded what was essen-
tially an internal armed conflict into one that can be
characterized as international. 123 In addition, the involvement
of NATO rather than the U.N. Security Council might be signif-
icant. If military action had been pursued under the auspices of
the Security Council, there might have been a tenuous argu-
ment that an enforcement action by the United Nations against
one country did not constitute an "international armed conflict"
contemplated by the Geneva Conventions. However, no such
argument exists in an action carried out by NATO, which is spe-
cifically a European/American military alliance with restricted
membership. At the same time, it is important to recognize
that the events of recent months have no retroactive application
to the crimes that occurred prior to the commencement of
NATO's bombing campaign. The national/international distinc-
tion remains important with regard to the prosecution of such
crimes. Crimes falling solely under the grave breaches provi-
sions of Article 2 that occurred prior to the NATO campaign
would likely not by punishable by the ICTY.
Finally, other defenses exist that may further complicate
the prosecution of defendants under the grave breaches provi-
sions. A defendant for example might argue that an ethnic Al-
banian does not have the status of a "victim" under the grave
breaches provisions of Article 2. As the Appeals Chamber noted
in the Tadic appeal in July, 1999, Geneva Convention IV (upon
which the grave breaches provisions are based) "intended to
123 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, July 15, 1999, at para. 84. (Ap-
peals Chamber, International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.) (visited Oct. 15,
1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealljudgement/Tadic9julyacc.html> [here-
inafter Tadic Judgment]. The definition of an "international" conflict is a relatively
broad one, as was noted by the Appeals Chamber as recently as July, 1999 when
Dusko Tadic appealed his conviction:
[An armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more
States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on
the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon
the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal
armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its
troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal
armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.
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protect civilians (in enemy territory, occupied territory or the
combat zone) who do not have the nationality of the belligerent
in whose hands they find themselves, or who are stateless per-
sons." 124 A Serb defendant might therefore argue that ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo are citizens of Yugoslavia, and therefore
not technically "victims" because they do not have the same
ethnicity as Serbs. However, the Appeals Chamber also noted
that another protected group are people who "are refugees and
thus no longer owe allegiance to [the belligerent] and no longer
enjoy its diplomatic protection ...."-125 In dicta, the Appeals
Chamber also noted that in the context of Yugoslavia, ethnicity
may ultimately be the deciding factor in determining one's "alle-
giance" in connection with establishing one's status as a victim
under Article 2.126 Ultimately, this defense may therefore be
unsuccessful, but it nevertheless exists as a potential roadblock
for the prosecution of crimes under Article 2.
B. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Article 3 states that such crimes "shall include, but not be
limited to:"
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property. 127
This list is not exhaustive.12s It's purpose is to cover those
crimes not covered by the "grave breaches" provisions. 129 The
mass bombing and burning of homes and villages in Kosovo
would fall within this category. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic
124 See Tadic Judgment, supra note 123, at para. 164.
125 See id.
126 See id. at para. 166.
127 ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 3.
128 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 87.
129 Id. at para. 89.
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held that Article 3 also includes violations of Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, which governs the rules of internal con-
flicts.130 Violations of Article 3 can include such crimes as mur-
der, torture, mutilation, and the taking of hostages. 131
However, the primary limitation to Article 3 is that it may not
be used as a method to punish infringements of the grave
breaches provisions in Article 2 of the Statute. 132 Otherwise,
Article 2 would become superfluous. 133 Thus, while the Tribu-
nal has jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes listed in Article 3
irrespective of the internal nature of the conflict, it is still pre-
vented from exercising jurisdiction over the more serious grave
breaches enumerated in Article 2..3 Under Articles 2 and 3 of
the ICTY Statute, a number of crimes and criminals may "fall
through the gaps" in Kosovo (prior to the NATO bombing cam-
paign) absent other enforcement measures. Those occurring af-
ter the NATO campaign likely have no such defense.
C. Genocide
Genocide is defined by Article 4 of the ICTY Statute as:
[tihe following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
130 Id. at 85, 89, 94, 103; see also MERON, supra note 119, at 214. The Appeals
Chamber in Tadic lists four requirements for a crime to fall within the Tribunal's
jurisdiction under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (to be distinguished from common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is merely one set of crimes punishable
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute). All of these requirements must be met:
a. (1) the alleged violation must be of an infringement of a rule of inter-
national humanitarian law
b. (2) the rule must be customary in nature (or if under treaty law, the
required conditions of the treaty must be met);
c. (3) the violations must be "serious", involving "grave consequences to
victim"
d. (4) the violation must entail individual criminal responsibility.
Id.
131 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Security Council, 3453' mtg.(1994); Barrett Printz,
The Treaty of Versailles to Rwanda: How the International Community Deals with
War Crimes, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 553, 563 n. 71 (1998).
132 See Tadic, supra note 71, at 87.
133 See id.
134 See MERON, supra note 119, at 214-15.
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cal destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. 3. The follow-
ing acts shall be punishable: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to com-
mit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in genocide. 135
Article 4 reproduces the provisions of the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, and is today
considered part of customary international law. 136 The crime
has two essential elements: (1) a commission of the of the pro-
hibited acts noted in the article; and (2) the specific intent to
destroy all or part of the members of a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, "as such." 137 Genocide is punishable regardless
of whether it occurs in the international or internal context, and
national sovereignty does not prevent an international tribunal
from exercising jurisdiction. 38
The first-ever "genocide" sentences to be handed down by
an international court took place in September, 1998, with the
convictions of Jean-Paul Akayesu and Jean Kambanda in
Rwanda.139 The critical challenge in proving genocide is dem-
onstrating the defendant's specific or "special" intent to destroy
in whole or in part a particular group.140 "iTlhe victim is chosen
not because of his individual identity, but rather on account of
his being a member of a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group. The victim of the act is therefore a member of a group,
135 ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 4(2)(a-e) and 4(3)(a-e) (emphasis
added).
136 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 86; Secretary-General's Rep.,
supra note 70, at para. 45.
137 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 86.
138 See MERON, supra note 119, at 215; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 81
n. 216.
139 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Sept. 2, 1998 (visited Oct. 15, 1999) reprinted at <http://
www.un.orgictr/englishlsingledocs/jpa-summary.html> [hereinafter Akayesul;
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No.
97-23-S, Sept. 4, 1998 (visited Oct. 15, 1999) reprinted at <http://www.org/ictr/eng-
lishljudgements/kambanda.html> [hereinafter Kambandal; Ex-Rwandan Mayor
Gets Life for Genocide, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1998, at A5; Rwandan
Ex-Chief Sentenced; Genocide Judge Rejects Leniency, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Oct. 5, 1998.
140 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 87; Akayesu, supra note 139, at
para. 42.
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targeted as such; hence, the victim of the crime of genocide is
the group itself and not the individual alone."141 Not only must
the rape, torture, killing, forcible transfer, etc. be proved, but
the defendant's overall intent to destroy the group itself must
be proved. This intent can be proved circumstantially, such as
by proving through evidence of patterns of activity that an "eth-
nic cleansing" was done as a matter of policy.142 However, this
is still a greater burden than merely showing that the act itself
took place.
Once again, reports of atrocities in Kosovo are not as well-
documented as they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although more
may be discovered now that the Tribunal has the ability to con-
duct its investigations following the Serb withdrawal from Ko-
sovo. However, without proving the requisite intent to destroy
a group, a number of crimes committed by Serb forces against
the Albanian citizens of Kosovo are not punishable under the
crime of genocide. It remains to be seen what the evidence will
show. Even the Tribunal itself has refrained as of the date of
this article from indicting any defendant in Kosovo (including
Milosevic) on the crime of Genocide, instead concentrating on
the crimes against humanity provisions of the ICTY Statute
(discussed below). 143
D. Crimes Against Humanity
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute clearly indicates that crimes
against humanity create criminal liability regardless of
whether the conflict is international or internal in character.144
This principle was affirmed by the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic.145 Crimes against humanity are defined as crimes "di-
rected against any civilian population," consisting of:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
141 Id. at para. 43.
142 See MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 86, at 87.
143 See Charles Trueheart, supra note 22.
144 See ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 5.
145 See Tadic, supra note 71, at para. 141.
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(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.1 4 6
The crime was first recognized in the trials of war criminals
following World War II. 147 The crime is further defined in the
U.N. Secretary General's report accompanying the statute:
Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious
nature, such as willful killing, torture and rape, committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian pop-
ulation on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
In the conflict of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhu-
mane acts have taken the form of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and
widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual as-
sault, including enforced prostitution. 148
Thus, the crime requires both an inhumane act, and that
the act be committed as part of a systematic plan or general
policy rather than random acts of violence. By noting that the
crime is committed against "any civilian population," Article 5
extends to atrocities committed against civilians which are not
covered by other war crimes, specifically "crimes committed by a
State against its own nationals." 49 Of particular importance is
that the crime does not require the specific intent to destroy all
or part of a group. It is therefore theoretically easier to
prove. 150 It is available where the prosecution of genocide is less
tenable because of an inability to establish specific intent, or
where prosecutions for grave breaches violations under Article
2 are impossible because of the internal nature of the Kosovo
conflict. 151
However, the burden exists to show that any prohibited act
by a defendant was part of an overall widespread or systematic
146 See ICTY Statute, supra note 85, at art. 5.
147 See Secretary-General's Rep., supra note 70, at para. 47.
148 Id. at para. 48 (emphasis added). Note that Morris believes that only Arti-
cle 5(h) requires the crimes to be directed toward members of a defined group. She
believes that the other acts in Article 5 do not require victims to be members of a
defined group, or even to share a common characteristic, such as ethnic, religious
or racial background. See MoRRIs & SCHARF, supra note 86, at 81.
149 See id. at 80.
150 See id. at 80-81.
151 See id. at 77-78.
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attack against ethnic Albanians. The critical issue will be
whether the evidence proves that the atrocities as discussed
above were part of a systematic attack, or whether they were
somehow isolated atrocities and abuses by renegade members of
the Serbian military who were not "properly supervised." The
facts available thus far strongly indicate, at least circumstan-
tially, that most were part of a coordinated systematic attack
against ethnic Albanians, rather than isolated abuses. The
events of late March through the present have provided even
stronger evidence of specifically coordinated action by Serb
forces against Kosovo civilians. The crime of crimes against hu-
manity may become the most useful tool of the Tribunal be-
cause it requires neither a specific intent to destroy a group nor
an international conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
The domestic nature of the Kosovo conflict, as it seems to be
recognized by the international community, creates particular
problems for the punishment of war crimes in Kosovo. While
the mass or forced migration of ethnic Albanians may create a
threat to international peace and security sufficient to justify
Security Council action in the region, the conflict itself was not
international in nature until March of 1999. As a result, the
international tribunal may only be permitted to prosecute the
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, at least with
regard to crimes that occurred prior to the commencement of
the NATO bombing campaign. Many of the atrocities commit-
ted in Kosovo may well fit into these categories, although some
may fall through the cracks into categories that are non-
prosecutable under the auspices of protecting national
sovereignty.
Slobodan Milosevic himself is named by human rights
groups as a war criminal with command authority over docu-
mented war crimes, and has been indicted by the ICTY. 152
However, the political reality is that it is unlikely under the
current power structure in Yugoslavia that he or other Yugo-
slav leaders will be subject to criminal liability for crimes com-
mitted either in Kosovo or in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
152 See Mertus, supra note 6, at n. 148; Trueheart, supra note 22.
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As recent events surrounding former Chilean president Au-
gusto Pinochet have demonstrated, that situation may be some-
day subject to change. 153
The authority for the United Nations Security Council to
exercise jurisdiction, at least for some crimes in Kosovo and Yu-
goslavia, already exists. The objective of this article is not to
comment on the steps that the West should or should not have
taken to carry out its promises to establish peace in the region.
However, the International Criminal Tribunal is legally justi-
fied in investigating and prosecuting certain human rights vio-
lations in the region. The situation in Kosovo is unique in that
the Security Council has already provided for the prosecution of
war crimes in the entire territory, while the actual use of force
within Kosovo was arguably still subject to a vote and potential
veto by a member of the Security Council. Without addressing
the legality of the use of NATO as an end run around a Security
Council resolution, now that the opportunity for enforcement
and prosecution exists, the Tribunal should take it. Regardless
of whether the Security Council itself has or had the authority
to attack Yugoslavia, it does have the authority, under Resolu-
tion No. 808, to prosecute war crimes, even if it is NATO and
not the United Nations that provided the opportunity.
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